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§ 3.01. Introduction.
The oil and gas lease has served as the basic contract for the petroleum
industry since before “Colonel” Edwin Drake struck oil in Titusville,
Pennsylvania in 1859.1 In fact, the first recorded lease, dated the fourth
day of July 1853, and filed in the county of Venango, Pennsylvania,
contained only 10 lines and ended with the prophetic statement: “If
profitable.”2 Running twice as long as this first lease, the Drake lease,
signed four years later in 1857, featured familiar clauses such as a provision
for a 1/8th royalty, termination conditions, and an initial 15-year term.3
1 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power 26 (1991). E.L.
Drake assumed the title “Colonel” in an effort to impress the locals. Id. at 26. Early oil
and gas leases were adapted from forms used in the salt industry in Pennsylvania, as oil
and gas were discovered as a result of borings for salt water. The salt industry leases had
evolved from the leases used for solid minerals. From the beginning, oil and gas leases
were used rather than outright land purchases because the owners of the land seldom
“had the money or the faith to test the productivity of their holdings.” Thus the lease
developed to grant to those with such resources, but with little interest in ownership of
the land, the privilege of exploration and production. Leslie Moses, “The Evolution and
Development of the Oil and Gas Lease,” 2 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax’n, 1, 10 (1951).
2 Leslie Moses, “The Evolution and Development of the Oil and Gas Lease,” 2 Inst.
on Oil & Gas L. & Tax’n, 1, 6 (1951).
3 Id. at 7.
Dated December 30, 1857
Deed Book P, p. 357
$1 in hand.
Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company to E.B. Bonditch and E.L. Drake
“Demise and Let all the lands owned or held under lease by said company
in this County of Vanango, State of Pennsylvania, ‘To bore, dig, mine, search
for and obtain oil, salt water, coal, and all materials existing in and upon said
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By the end of the century, as the industry evolved and geological
knowledge expanded, other clauses considered “typical” by today’s
standards began appearing in oil and gas leases, including the habendum
clause, bonus payment and delay rental provisions, and drilling and savings
clauses. And by 1920 these and other “standard” clauses could be found
in several variations of the popular “Producers 88” form.4
Throughout the decades, the “typical” oil and gas lease clauses have
been developed and revised in response to judicial decisions. As Professor
A.W. Walker noted nearly 50 years ago, “The clauses in the modern oil
and gas lease [have evolved] through many years of trial and error and
after a great amount of litigation and judicial construction.”5 And, as he
predicted, that evolutionary process has continued. To provide an update
on that process, this chapter reviews selected court decisions construing
lease clauses. The cases discussed include recent decisions and older cases
providing unique lessons about particular lease clauses. In order to better
evaluate these court decisions, the chapter begins with a description of
the general rules of document interpretation which courts purport to follow
when scrutinizing an oil and gas lease clause. The next sections provide a
basic description of the wording and purposes of various clauses, followed
by a discussion of cases which demonstrate the effect of those provisions.
lands, and take, remove and sell such, etc., for their own exclusive use and
benefit, for the term of 15 years, with the privilege of renewal for the same
term. Rental, one-eighth of all oil as collected from the springs in barrels
furnished and paid for by lessees. . . . Lessees agree to prosecute operations
as early in the spring of 1858 as the season will permit, and if they fail to
work the property for an unreasonable length of time, or fail to pay rent more
than 60 days, the lease will be null and void.’” Id. at 7.
4 However, while these forms contain many “typical” clauses, one version can vary
substantially from another; therefore, the Producers 88 label does not suggest a “standard”
lease form. These variations caused an early Texas court to determine that the caption
“Producers 88” was “incapable of definite application.” Fagg v. Texas Co., 57 S.W.2d
87 (Tex. Com. App. 1933). For a description of the history behind the “Producers 88”
form see Leslie Moses, supra note 2, at 27; A.W. Walker, Jr., “Defects and Ambiguities
in Oil and Gas Leases,” 28 Tex. L. Rev. 895, 896-97 (1950).
5 A.W. Walker, supra note 4, at 909 (1950).
6 The scope of this chapter is limited to the legal implications of express lease
provisions. The effect of implied obligations, through the doctrine of implied covenants,
will not be discussed.
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These case discussions also examine the role played by rules of
interpretation in court decisions which have determined the legal
implications of express lease provisions.6
§ 3.02. Determining the Meaning of Express Lease
Provisions.
 [1] — The General Rules of Document Interpretation.
When faced with determining the legal implications of an express
provision in an oil and gas lease, courts must first read the lease and
determine its meaning. Therefore, court opinions construing lease clauses
often recite a litany of rules governing document interpretation.7 Although
variations exist from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, these rules are frequently
set forth as a three-step process.
First, a court strives to ascertain the parties’ intent by examining the
language contained within the “four corners” of the document. If the
language is not clear, in the next step in the interpretative process courts
will enlist a “catalogue of canons of construction.”8 These canons function
as aids in determining intent, rather than as rules dictating a particular
outcome. The list of canons began developing at common law and includes
such directives as “construe the document against the drafter,” “the law
abhors forfeiture,” and “typewritten or handwritten provisions control
over printed form provisions.”9 Because the list of canons is lengthy and
7 In general, the same rules of interpretation apply to different types of documents,
including contracts, wills, deeds, and oil and gas leases. However, depending upon the
document at issue, different policy considerations may be raised. For example, courts
frequently stress the goal of ensuring title stability when construing deeds, and the goal
of ascertaining the intent of the parties when construing wills. Compare Moser v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984)(promoting stability of land titles when construing
deeds) with Sammons v. Elder, 940 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Tex. Civ. App. — Waco 1977, writ
denied)(stating court’s primary goal in interpreting wills is to determine intent of textratix);
see also, 15 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 85.19 (1988); 2 Richard R.
Powell, Powell on Real Property § 16.03[6] (1988).
8 See Bruce Kramer, “The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases:
An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction,” 24 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
9 See Laura H. Burney, “The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas
Deed Construction,” 34 S. Tex. L. Rev. 73, 76-77 (1993); see e.g., Molag Inc. v. Climax
Molybdenum Co., 637 A.2d 322, 323 (Pa. 1994)(stating courts are free to construe the
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varied, advocates generally can produce canons which support their
competing interpretations of the document.10
If after applying these canons a court determines that the meaning is
still unclear, courts move to the third step and label the document
ambiguous.11 The determination of ambiguity, however, is a question of
law for the court.12 The ambiguity finding is significant for at least two
reasons: First, it precludes the granting of a motion for summary judgment
because the interpretation of the instrument becomes a fact issue.13 Second,
the ambiguity determination permits the consideration of extrinsic
evidence.14
[2] — Can Courts Consider Extrinsic Evidence
in Interpreting a Lease Clause?
In general, courts are consistent in permitting the consideration of
extrinsic evidence once the document has been labeled ambiguous.15
document’s terms against the drafter); Sharp v. Norwood, 643 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (N.Y.
1996)(stating well-settled equitable principle that law abhors forfeiture of leases); Vigneau
v. Storch Eng’rs, No. Civ. 8907001225, 1995 WL 767984 at 6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 4,
1995)(stating the law abhors forfeiture); Posner v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 226
N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1017 (N.Y. Sup. 1962)(stating typewritten or handwritten material controls
over printed form).
10 As Karl Llewellyn stated in his renowned and often quoted article, “there are two
opposing canons in almost every point.” Karl Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed,”
3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950).
11 See Kramer, supra note 8, at 61-62; Mark K. Glasser & Keith A. Rowley, “On Parole:
The Construction and Interpretation of Written Agreements and the Role of Extrinsic
Evidence in Contract Litigation,” 49 Baylor L. Rev. 657, 693 (1997).
12 Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983); McMahon v. Christmann, 157
Tex. 403, 407, 303 S.W.2d 341, 344 (1957); Lewis X. Cohen Insur. Trust v. Stern, 696
N.E.2d 743, 751 (Ill. App. 1998); Strader v. Sunstates Corp., 500 S.E.2d 752, 755 (N.C.
App. 1998); Dechert v. Maine Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 711 A.2d 1290, 1291 (Me. 1998).
13 See Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393; Glasser & Rowley, supra note 11 at 701.
14 A Mississippi Supreme Court decision articulated the steps in the interpretative
process as follows: 1) “the court will attempt to ascertain intent by examining the language
contained within the ‘four corners’ of the instrument in dispute”; 2) the use of applicable
canons of contract construction; and 3) consideration of extrinsic or parol evidence. Pursue
Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 351-53 (Miss. 1990).
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However, they are frequently hesitant to consider such evidence prior to
making that determination. Instead, many courts profess to be confined
to the “plain meaning” of words found within “the four corners” of the
document, even when determining whether the document is ambiguous
as a matter of law Although courts frequently fail to articulate their reasons
for excluding extrinsic evidence at this point in the interpretative process,
that approach may stem from confusion about the role of the parol evidence
rule in document interpretation.
The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive contract law which
prohibits courts from considering extrinsic evidence, oral or otherwise,
which contradicts or varies the terms of an “integrated” document. Under
this rule, then, the initial inquiry is whether the document is “integrated”
and final, rather than incomplete. If the document is “integrated,” a
question of law for the court, then evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreements is not admissible.16 However, evidence which does not
contradict the terms of the “integrated” agreement is admissible. Moreover,
extrinsic evidence could also be admitted under the fraud exception to
the parol evidence rule.17
However, strictly speaking, the parol evidence rule does not prevent
a court from considering extrinsic evidence in the interpretative process.
Arthur Corbin’s Corbin on Contracts explains the distinction as follows:
15 At common law, Lord Bacon determined that the admissibility of extrinsic evidence
depended upon whether the document contained a patent or a latent ambiguity. In his
view, no extrinsic evidence of any kind was admissible to remedy a patent ambiguity,
but evidence of intention was permissible to solve a latent ambiguity. See, 7 W.S.
Holdsworth, A History of English Law 389-92 (1926). Today, most courts have abandoned
that distinction. Roger A. Cunningham, et. al., The Law of Property § 11.1 at 717-18
(1984)
16 For an excellent discussion of the parol evidence rule and rules of interpretation see
Glasser & Rowley, supra note 11, at 657. On the integration question the authors explain
that “while the court must determine whether the agreement is integrated before admitting
parol evidence for the trier of fact’s consideration, the trial court is free to rely on the
very same parol evidence in reaching its threshold determination that the agreement is
or is not integrated.” Id. at 707.
17 See Scott J. Burnham, “The Parol Evidence Rule: Don’t Be Afraid of the Dark,” 55
Mont. L. Rev. 93, 133 (1994); 2 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 816.03[6]
(1998).
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The “parol evidence rule” is not, and does not purport to be,
a rule of interpretation or a rule as to the admission of evidence
for the purpose of interpretation. Even if a written document
has been assented to as the complete and accurate integration
of the terms of a contract, it must still be interpreted; and all
of those factors that are of assistance in this process may be
proved by oral testimony.18
In light of this distinction, Corbin and other authorities sanction the
consideration of a wide-range of extrinsic evidence in the interpretative
process.19 The Restatement also criticizes the “plain meaning” approach
to interpreting documents for condoning the exclusion of evidence as to
the circumstances of its formulation: “This rule, in so far as it causes such
exclusion, is disapproved, since language is so colored by the
18 3 Corbin on Contracts § 579 (1960). But see Eric A. Posner, “The Parol Evidence
Rule, The Plain Meaning Rule, and The Principles of Contractual Interpretation,” 146
U. Pa. L. Rev. 533, 534 (1998). The author states the parol evidence rule as follows: “A
court will refuse to use evidence of the parties’ prior negotiations in order to interpret a
written contract unless the writing is (1) incomplete, (2) ambiguous, or (3) the product
of fraud, mistake, or a similar bargaining defect.” In a footnote, the author also notes that
“[p]urists will object that I conflate the plain meaning rule, which I treat as exception
two, and the parol evidence rule. As far as I can tell, nothing turns on this distinction,
and my version avoids needless complexities. Because both the parol evidence rule and
the plain meaning rule concern the same issue — under what circumstances extrinsic
evidence can be used to supplement a writing — they are best analyzed together.” Id. at
n.1.
19 See, e.g., 3 Corbin on Contracts § 579 (1960). “The parol evidence rule is a rule of
substantive law not related to interpretation or the admission of evidence of the purpose
of interpretation. Oral testimony of facts relevant to meaning are not within that principle.
Parol evidence cannot be said to vary or contradict a writing until by process of
interpretation it is determined what the writing means . . . such testimony does not vary
or contradict the written words; it determines that which cannot be varied or contradicted.”
Id.
A well-known debate took place between Professors Corbin and Williston on this
point. Professor Williston adopted a stricter approach to the use of extrinsic evidence in
the interpretative process. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts
§§ 3-3; 3-10 (3d ed. 1987). Similarly, regarding the interpretation of deeds, the
Restatement (Second) of Property concludes that a conveyance should be read as an
entirety “and in light of the circumstances of its formulation.” Restatement (First) of
Property § 242.
§ 3.02
EASTERN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE
92
circumstances of its formulation that the exclusion of otherwise admissible
evidence as to such circumstances is never justified.”20
Therefore, according to well-respected authorities, the parol evidence
rule does not provide a basis for a court’s refusal to consider extrinsic
evidence when interpreting a document; rather, rules of interpretation
should govern. Under those rules, a court can properly consider extrinsic
evidence of surrounding circumstances to ascertain the meaning of the
words found within the four corners of the document.21 “Surrounding
circumstances” could include evidence of course of performance, usage
of trade, and, according to the Restatement of Property, other evidence of
the “circumstances of the instrument’s formulation.”22
However, while one can cite impressive authorities which sanction
the consideration of extrinsic evidence in the interpretative process, even
absent an “ambiguity” determination, many courts prefer a “plain
meaning” approach.23 Moreover, regardless of the approach used in each
jurisdiction, a practitioner can rarely predict, with confidence, the
interpretation a court will attach to a document. Scholars have long
identified the reason for this unpredictability:
20 Id. at cmt. c.
21 In a recent article the authors conclude, “The importance of the ‘surrounding
circumstances’ rule cannot be overemphasized . . . this rule affirmatively invites the trial
court to consider extrinsic proof even in the absence of a pleading of, much less a finding
of, ambiguity, and even in those cases in which the parties stipulate that the contract is
fully integrated.” Glasser & Rawley, supra note 11, at 667.
22 Restatement (First) of Property 242 at cmt. d. The Restatement broadly defines
evidence of the “circumstances of formulation” as including prevailing manners of
expression, vocabulary peculiar to the conveyor, and knowledge or belief of conveyor
concerning the claimants upon his bounty. Id. See also, 3 Corbin on Contracts § 579
(1960); John Calamari & Joseph Perillo, supra note 19, § 3-7 at 115.
23 See, e.g., Grass v. Grass, 47 Conn. App. 657, 706 A.2d 1369, 1371-72 (Conn. 1998);
Echo Consulting Services, Inc. v. North Conway Bank, 140 N.H. 566, 669 A.2d 227,
230 (N.H. 1995); Willison v. Consolidation Coal Co., 536 Pa. 49, 637 A.2d 979, 982 (Pa.
1994); Republic Leasing Co. v. Haywood, 495 S.E.2d 804, 806 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); see
also, John S. Lowe, “Defining the Royalty Obligation,” 49 SMU L. Rev. 223, 264-65
(1996)(defining jurisdictions either as “plain terms” jurisdictions or “cooperative venture”
jurisdictions dependent upon the court’s interpretation of royalty obligations in gas royalty
clauses).
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[T]here is no unanimity as to the content of the parol evidence
rule or the process called interpretation . . . . It would, however,
be a mistake to suppose that the courts follow any of these
rules blindly, literally or consistently. As often as not they
choose the standard or the rule that they think will give rise
to a just result in the particular case. We have also seen that
often under a guise of interpretation a court will actually
enforce its notions of ‘public policy’ which is ‘nothing more
than an attempt to do justice.’24
In sum, the rules of document interpretation and the parol evidence
rule traditionally have had different aims. The rules of interpretation are
designed to ascertain the meaning of a document while the parol evidence
rule is designed to exclude outside evidence of other agreements when
the parties intend the writing to contain their entire agreement. But the
two sets of rules do share a common trait: they are deceptively simple to
recite but riddled with subtle difficulties, leading to unpredictable and
inconsistent results in practice.25
In order to analyze the application of rules of interpretation in practice,
the following sections of this chapter discuss specific cases interpreting
various lease clauses. In addition to analyzing the interpretative approach
used in each case and the legal implications of the courts’ conclusions,
these sections provide general information about the basic purposes of
selected lease clauses.
24 John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, supra note 19, § 3-16, at 177; see also Laura
H. Burney, supra note 9, at 79 (“The process of interpretation or construction, including
the determination of ambiguity and the use of extrinsic evidence, is presented as beguiling
precise, but scholars admit the rules are ‘complex, technical, and difficult to apply.’”).
25 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 18, at 540 (stating “In virtually every jurisdiction one
finds irreconcilable cases, frequent changes in doctrine, confusion and cries of despair.”);
Glasser & Rowley, supra note 11, at 39 (stating, “[I]nterspersed in this quagmire are
quicksand like state court decisions, which appear equitable in specific situations but
remain perilous for legal precedent.”); Burnham, supra note 17, at 99 (noting about the
use of parol evidence rule, that “not only have different men viewed the subject differently,
but the same men at different times have held opinions not easily reconciled”).
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§ 3.03. The Royalty Clause.
[1] — In General.
The royalty clause establishes the lessee’s obligation to pay royalties
to the lessor once production has been obtained. In general, the royalty
obligation creates a covenant, not a condition.26 For that reason, the
lessee’s failure to pay royalties does not terminate the lease. Instead, the
lessor’s remedy is to sue the lessee for breach of the covenant to pay.
However, parties could draft a lease which converts the royalty obligation
into a terminating condition, as revealed in the Hitzelberger case discussed
below. Additionally, at least one state, North Dakota, has a statute which
provides that cancellation is a remedy for the lessee’s failure to pay
royalties.27
[2] — Case Examples.
[a] — The Gas Royalty Cases.
Historically, because of market fluctuations and extensive regulatory
schemes for gas, the gas royalty clause has been the subject of extensive
litigation. This litigation has produced a number of cases defining the
terms found in the gas royalty clause, particularly the phrase “market
value at the well.” The meaning of that phrase became crucial during the
late 1970s and early 1980s when prevailing market values for gas were
much higher than the prices lessees were receiving under their long-term
gas contracts. Lessors demanded that lessees calculate their royalty based
on the higher price.28
Ultimately, jurisdictions applied different meanings to the “market
value” phrase. Professor John Lowe has categorized these contrasting
decisions into “plain meaning” and “cooperative venture” jurisdictions.29
Plain meaning jurisdictions interpreted the phrase “market value at the
26 The royalty clause creates a condition in an “unless” lease and a covenant in an “or”
lease. These two types of leases are discussed in § 3.03.
27 N.D. Cent. Code § 47-16-39.1 (1997).
28 For a description of the forces which created the “market value” royalty controversies,
see Laura H. Burney, “The Interaction of the Division Order and the Lease Royalty Clause,”
28 St. Mary’s L.J. 353, 362-363 (1997).
29 John Lowe, supra note 23, at 233-36.
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well” as referring to the value a willing buyer and seller would negotiate
on the day of production, as opposed to the price the lessee negotiated in
its long-term contract.30 Cooperative venture jurisdictions, on the other
hand, considered the marketing realities existing at the time lessees
negotiated the contracts to which they had dedicated the gas, which showed
that lessees had virtually no choice but to market gas through long-term
sales contracts. These jurisdictions allowed lessees to calculate royalties
on their lower contract prices.31
The different results in these cases can be explained, at least in part,
by the varying approaches to document interpretation used by the courts.32
For example, in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,33 a plain meaning decision
from the Texas Supreme Court, the court purported to focus only on the
language in the lease and refused to consider the marketing realities
prevailing when the leases were executed.34 The court devoted very little
space to rules of interpretation. After reviewing the gas royalty clause in
the lease, the court concluded:
It is clear then that the parties knew how to and did provide
for royalties payable in kind, based upon market price or
market value, and based upon proceeds derived by the lessee
from the sale of gas. They might have agreed that the royalty
on gas produced from a gas well would be a fractional part of
the amount realized by the lessee from its sale. Instead of
30 Jurisdictions falling into this category include Texas, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota,
Mississippi, and West Virginia. Id.
31 Jurisdictions in this category include Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. Id.
32 In addition to the rules of document interpretation, however, the courts relied upon
equitable notions and other legal doctrines. For example, some of the cooperative venture
decisions relied upon the implied covenant to market. See Hillard v. Stephens, 637 S.W.2d
581 (Ark. 1982); Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Okla. 1981).
The court in Hughey, also noted the “fundamental unfairness to producers of royalties
based on a price higher than the contract price.” Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court quoted
extensively from Hughey and relied heavily on Professor Harrell’s description of the oil
and gas lease as a “cooperative venture.” Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d
1334, 1338 (La. 1982).
33 Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
34 Id. at 879.
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doing so, however, they stipulated in plain terms that the lessee
would pay one-eighth of the market price at the well of all
gas sold or used off the premises. This clearly means the
prevailing market price at the time of the sale or use.35
Yet in a cooperative venture case from Oklahoma, Tara Petroleum
Corp. v. Hughey,36 the court analyzed the phrase “market value” in light
of these marketing realities. In adopting the Hughey conclusion, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp.,37
applied “pertinent rules of contract interpretation” and determined that
“the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of contracting are
a relevant subject of inquiry.”38
By turning to “surrounding circumstances,” the approach used in
cooperative venture cases coincides with the rules of interpretation
described above, such as the of Property’s directive that documents should
be construed in light of the circumstances of their formulation.39 The
Vela decision, on the contrary, epitomizes the reason the Restatement
criticizes the plain meaning rule by refusing to recognize that “language
is so colored by the circumstances of its formulation that the exclusion of
otherwise admissible evidence as to such circumstances is never
35 Id. at 871.
36 Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P. 2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
37 Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So.2d 1334 (La. 1982).
38 Id. at 1339.
39 It is unclear whether the cooperative venture cases considered extrinsic evidence
after labeling the document ambiguous, or whether they considered that evidence relevant,
under rules of interpretation, regardless of that determination. The Henry case, for example,
refers to the contract provisions as “ambiguous.” Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1339. But at the
same time, the court’s description of the appropriate interpretative approach recognizes
that it is always appropriate to consider surrounding circumstances in order to “judge the
meaning of the words and the correct application of the language of the contract.” Id. at
n.12. See also Hughey, 630 P.2d at 1273 (viewing contract as “freighted with inherent
ambiguity” but determining as a matter of law that “market value” refers to the lessee’s
contract if reasonable when made).
40 Restatement (First) of Property § 242 cmt. c.
41 These contrasts can be found not only from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but among
the judges on a court in any particular jurisdiction, as demonstrated by the strong dissenting
opinions filed in “plain meaning” and “cooperative venture” decisions. For example, in
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justified.”40 More importantly, these cases reveal the contrasting
approaches to document interpretation used by courts41 and the impact
those approaches have on the rights and liabilities of parties to an oil and
gas lease.
[b] — Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank —
“No Deductions” Phrase Permits Deductions
from Royalty.
In addition to the issue addressed by the cases discussed above, the
“market value” royalty provision raises another question: whether that
phrase permits the deduction of post-production costs. The cases
addressing that issue have been the subject of a number of recent articles,
and will not be discussed here.42 However, this section will review a
recent Texas Supreme Court case which interpreted an additional phrase
in the royalty clause, a phrase which stated there would be “no deductions
from the value of the Lessor’s royalty.”
In Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank,43 NationsBank, as trustee
for several interest owners, brought suit in 1989 against the lessee,
Heritage, claiming that Heritage had improperly deducted post-production
costs from royalty payments. The trial court ruled that the bank was entitled
Vela, a dissenting justice concluded that “[s]ince it appears that the royalty provision
fails to state as of what time the ‘market price’ is to be determined, I think, we must look
to common practices in the industry at the time the lease contract was made in 1933 to
ascertain what was the intention of the parties with reference to this matter.” Vela, 429
S.W.2d at 879 (Hamilton, J. dissenting). In Henry, a dissenting justice chastised the
majority for treating the leases as ambiguous and argued that the canon of construction,
“construe leases against lessees,” should have been applied. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1343
(Watson, J., dissenting).
42 See, e.g., Owen Anderson, “Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be
Determined Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically?,” (Part 1 — “Why All the Fuss?
What Does History Reveal?”), 37 Nat. Resources J. ___ (forthcoming) and (Part 2 —
“Should Courts Contemplate The Forest or Dissect Each Tree?”), 37 Nat. Resources J.
___ (forthcoming); John Lowe, supra note 23 at 232; David E. Pierce, Developments in
Non-regulatory Oil and Gas Law: The Continuing Search for Analytical Foundations §
1.07[4][b], 47 Inst. Oil & Gas L. & Tax’n (1996).
43 Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 960 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1997).
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to damages for the transportation deductions, plus interest and attorney
fees.44 On appeal, Heritage claimed the trial court had misinterpreted the
royalty clause as prohibiting the deduction of transportation costs.45
The leases at issue contained “market value at the well” gas royalty
clauses. However, the royalty clauses also included the following language:
. . . [t]here shall be no deductions from the value of the
Lessor’s royalty by reason of any required processing, cost
of dehydration, compression, transportation or other matter
to market such gas.46
Despite this “no deductions” language, Heritage argued the clause
did not prohibit the transportation-cost deductions. In making this
argument, it relied upon the following syllogism. First, the phrase “the
value of the Lessor’s royalty” was equivalent to the “market value at the
well.” The “market value at the well” standard, according to Heritage,
inherently permits the deduction of post-production costs, such as those
incurred in transporting the gas. It follows, Heritage asserted, that the
royalty clauses should be interpreted to mean that the lessee could deduct
no more than the reasonable costs permitted under the “market value at
the well” standard. And since the bank had not claimed the deductions
were unreasonable, Heritage had not violated the terms of the royalty
clause, including the “no deductions” provision.47
In considering Heritage’s argument, the court of appeals invoked the
familiar litany of rules of interpretation. The court, for instance, noted
that its goal was to determine the intent of the parties as expressed in the
instrument. Because neither party had viewed the lease as ambiguous,
the court considered that it was confined to the plain language of the
lease, without resort to extrinsic evidence.48
44 895 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. App. — El Paso 1995), rev’d, 960 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.
1997).
45 Id. Heritage also argued that even if that interpretation were correct, division orders
had expressly permitted those deductions and were binding until revoked. For a discussion
of the division order issue in Heritage, see Laura Burney, supra note 29, at 382.
46 Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 835-36.
47 Id. at 836.
48 Id.
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In applying this “plain language” rule, the court of appeals first
considered the phrase “market value at the well.” Ultimately, the court
determined that as a general rule that phrase contemplates the deduction of
post-production costs from royalty.49 However, it found that this general
rule had been modified in this case by the “no deductions” language in the
royalty clause.
In reaching that conclusion, the court again relied upon rules of
interpretation. Specifically, the court declared that it should make “every
attempt to harmonize and give effect to all provisions of the contract so
that none is rendered meaningless.”50 In rejecting Heritage’s theory about
the interpretation of the “no deductions” clause, the court relied heavily on
this “harmonizing” canon, noting that while Heritage’s interpretation would
render meaningless much of the language in the royalty clauses, the bank’s
interpretation “allows all provisions to be harmonized, giving meaning to
each.”51
Heritage appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. That court produced
opinions which exemplify the nebulous nature of the interpretative process.
The court initially produced an opinion in Heritage’s favor, with two justices
concurring and two justices dissenting. Despite receiving dozens of amicus
curiae briefs asking the court to change its decision, the supreme court
overruled the bank’s motion for rehearing. However, four justices dissented
from that ruling, another switched to the concurring opinion, and yet another
recused himself from participating.52 Therefore, the opinion now stands as
a four to four decision in favor of Heritage, but with only one justice signing
the original majority opinion.
49 Id. at 837.
50 Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 836.
51 Id. at 837. Having interpreted the lease royalty clause, the court then considered the
effect of division orders on that clause and concluded those documents did not permit
the deductions. Id. at 837. For a criticism of the court’s division order analysis see Burney,
supra, note 29, at 386-392.
52 Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 960 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. 1997)(dissenting
opinion). “Justice Cornyn and Justice Spector have joined Justice Abbott and me in voting
to grant NationsBank’s motion for rehearing. Chief Justice Phillips has also switched his
position and now agrees with Justice Owen’s concurrence, in which Justice Hecht joined.
Justice Enoch has recused himself on rehearing, leaving Justice Baker as the lone
remaining supporter of his original majority opinion. Thus, the court is now deadlocked
four-to-four on the proper disposition of the case.” Id.
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The court’s original majority opinion agreed with the appellate court’s
assessment of the “market value” royalty phrase as permitting the deduction
of post-production costs.53 The concurring justices expressed doubt about
the certainty of that conclusion under Texas law.54 But both of these opinions
adopted Heritage’s interpretation of the “no deductions” clause. Those
opinions focused primarily on the phrase “the value of Lessor’s royalty,”
and agreed with Heritage’s theory that the “value of the lessor’s royalty”
equaled the “market value at the well,” a term which permits reasonable
deductions. Because the bank had conceded that transportation costs were
reasonable, the court concluded there had not been a deduction from the
“value of the lessor’s royalty.”55
Even if one agrees with the court’s conclusion about the meaning of
the phrase “market value at the well,” its treatment of the “no deductions”
language is novel at best. In interpreting the royalty clause containing this
phrase, the court contradicted the very rules of construction it recited. For
example, both the majority and concurring opinions noted the presumption
that parties intend “every clause to have some effect,” but then held that
the “no deductions” phrase in the lease “was surplusage as a matter of
law.”56 Understandably, the court cited no authority for this “surplusage”
canon of construction.
In disagreeing with the court’s assessment of the “no deductions” clause,
the dissenting justices opined that the language of this phrase could not
have been “more clear.”57 The dissenting opinion also acknowledged a
common phenomenon in document interpretation cases, in which both
parties view the document as unambiguous while attaching opposing
meanings to its language.58 However, in outlining its view of the
interpretative process, the dissent describes an approach at odds with an
53 Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996).
54 Id. at 129-31 (Owen, J., concurring).
55 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537, 540 (Apr. 25, 1996).
56 Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 123. The concurring
opinion also viewed the “no deductions” language as “surplusage” and “ineffective.” Id.
at 130 (Owen, J., concurring).
57 Heritage, 939 S.W.2d at 131 (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 132. “The majority and the concurrence both state that they agree with the
trial court and the court of appeals that the leases in question are unambiguous (citation
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earlier Texas supreme Court case, the Madeley decision discussed below,
and the Restatement (Second) of Property and other authorities discussed
above. The divergence from these sources occurs on two issues. First,
regarding the use of surrounding circumstances, the dissent suggests that
such evidence may be considered only after the document has been labeled
ambiguous. Second, that opinion would apply canons of construction, such
as “leases are to be construed against the lessee,” only after determining
that the leases were ambiguous, rather than as an aid in making that
determination.59 These variances reflect the pervasive disagreement about
the content and application of rules of interpretation. Yet they did not affect
the dissents’ conclusion since that opinion viewed the deed as
unambiguously prohibiting the deductions in “plain English.”60
According to the dissent, the final four-to-four opinion in Heritage
permitting the deductions should have limited precedential value.61
Moreover, because the majority and concurring opinions emphasized the
“value of the Lessor’s royalty” phrase, a court could interpret a “no
deductions” provision without that phrase as prohibiting the deduction of
post-production costs. For drafting “no deductions” clauses in the future,
practitioners should heed the Heritage example and avoid the “value of the
Lessor’s royalty” phrase. The difficulty, again demonstrated by Heritage,
is choosing language intended to prohibit deductions, which a court will
actually interpret as intended.62
omitted). I find their agreement odd and amusing given that, interpreting the same
contracts, both opinions reach a completely opposite result than the lower courts.” Id.
59 Id. See Kramer, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that “approach of using canons before
determining legal ambiguity is borrowed from the contract arena”).
60 Heritage, 939 S.W.2d at 131 (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 133. In addition to disagreeing with the court’s interpretation of the “no
deductions” phrase, the dissent also disagreed with the court’s conclusion that the phrase
“market value at the well” permits the deduction of post-production costs. Instead, the
dissent concluded that “cases establish that a royalty interest does not bear such expenses,
contrary to the result the Court reached.” Id. at 133.
62 Regarding the drafting of “no deductions” clauses, see Laura Burney, supra note 28,
at 398 (concluding “practitioners could consider heeding the words of the concurring
opinion, which suggests using clauses stating that royalty would be based on the market
value at the ‘point of delivery or sale.’ In today’s new gas market, however, marked by
deregulation, unbundled prices, and evolving roles for producers, processors, and
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[c] — Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley63 —
A Unique Royalty Provision.
While the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in favor of Heritage strayed
from the traditional canons of construction and created a new one, the
appellate court opinion in that case properly applied the “harmonizing”
canon. A case providing another example of a careful application of the
rules of document interpretation is Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley. In particular,
in Madeley, the Texas Supreme Court followed the Restatement (Second)
of Property’s view regarding the use of extrinsic evidence in the
interpretative process.
In Madeley, decided by the Texas Supreme Court in 1981, the court
construed a lease, executed in 1932, with a unique royalty provision. The
specific clause at issue was a royalty provision, separate from the usual
lessor’s royalty clause, which both parties viewed as “unambiguous.”64
The issue was whether the additional clause required the lessee to pay the
lessors one-half of the working interest for gas, as well as for oil. In arguing
that this payment obligation was restricted to oil, the lessee emphasized
the language of that clause:
In addition to the royalty provided for in the preceding
paragraph, Lessee shall deliver to Lessors . . . one-half of the
oil accruing to the seven-eighths working interest from that
produced and saved from said land, same to be delivered in
the same manner as provided for the delivery of said royalty
oil; subject, however, to the deductions and charges
hereinafter provided . . .. (emphasis added).65
In arguing that this obligation applied to both oil and gas, the lessors
asserted two points. First, the lease contained other accounting provisions
transporters, even that phrase may be difficult to interpret and easy to manipulate.”). See
also Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., 939 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1996), in which the court
concluded that the following phrase prohibited deductions: “as to all gas sold by Lessee
under a written contract, the price received by Lessee for such gas shall be conclusively
presumed to be the net proceeds at the well or the market value at the well for the gas so
sold.” Id. at n.1.
63 Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982).
64 Id. at 727.
65 Id. at 728.
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governing deductions which referred to “deliveries to lessors of one-half
(1/2) of the oil, gas and other minerals” (emphasis added).66 Second, the
lessees had for years paid the lessors one-half the working interest of oil
and gas, until revoking the division orders under which it had made these
payments for gas, claiming the lease did not create that obligation.67 The
trial court and the court of appeals ruled in favor of the lessors.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that the
working-interest provision applied only to oil, not gas. In reaching this
conclusion, the court reviewed the rules of document interpretation and
the role of extrinsic evidence. The court agreed with the lessors’ contention
that “[e]vidence of surrounding circumstances may be consulted.”68 The
court stated, “If, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the language
of the contract appears to be capable of only a single meaning, the court
can then confine itself to the writing.”69
At this point in the interpretive process, the court reviewed evidence
of circumstances surrounding the execution of the lease. This evidence
included a memorandum from the lessee’s files, the prevailing market
value of gas as opposed to oil at the time the lease was executed, and the
fact that the lessors’ bargaining position was strong at the time since their
property was next to a proven oil field.70 Significantly, however, the court
refused to consider the lessee’s subsequent conduct, specifically its practice
of actually paying the lessors a half-working interest for both the oil and
the gas. According to the court, such subsequent conduct, unlike evidence
of surrounding circumstances, can only be considered once the court
determines the lease is ambiguous.71
66 Id. at 730.
67 When production was originally commenced, the amount of gas produced was
minimal. However, in 1977, Sun completed gas wells in a deeper zone which were capable
of producing large volumes of gas. At that point, Sun reviewed the lease clause and
determined that it did not require payments of one-half of the working interest on gas.
The lessors responded by filing suit. Id. at 727.
68 Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981).
69 Id. at 731.
70 Id. at 732.
71 Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 733 (Tex. 1981).
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The court, however, disagreed with the lessor’s view of the
surrounding circumstances. Instead, the court viewed that evidence as
consistent with the lessee’s contention that the lease clause applied only
to one-half the working interest in oil.72 Having made that determination,
the court treated the lease as unambiguous and confined itself to the four
corners of the document.73
The Texas Supreme Court’s approach to document interpretation
appears consistent with the views of the authorities discussed above,
particularly the Restatement of Property. Recall that the Restatement
sanctions interpreting conveyances in light of the circumstances of their
formulation.74 In Madeley, the Texas court recited principles in accord
with that proposition:
. . . In interpreting contracts or clauses set forth in ‘clear and
unambiguous’ language, the courts do not confine themselves
to a mere inspection of the document. Before committing
themselves, the courts carefully examine the surrounding
circumstances, prior negotiations, and all other relevant
incidents bearing on the intent of the parties . . . .75
The court adhered to these rules of interpretation by considering
evidence of “surrounding circumstances,” but not evidence of the parties’
subsequent conduct.
[d] — Hitzelberger v. Samedan Oil Corporation76 —
Converting the Royalty Clause into a
Terminating Condition.
Citing Madeley, this recent Texas court of appeals decision again
refused to consider the parties’ subsequent interpretation of another unique
royalty provision. In Hitzelberger, the lessor claimed the lease had
72 Id. at 731.
73 Id. at 732.
74 The Restatement (First) of Property.
75 Madeley, 626 S.W.2d at 731 n.5 (quoting with approval from 4 Williston on Contracts
§ 600A).
76 Hitzelberger v. Samedan Oil Corporation, 948 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997,
writ denied).
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terminated when the lessee paid royalties late. The lessor relied upon the
following provision in the lease royalty clause:
Within 120 days following the first sale of oil or gas produced
from the leased premises, settlement shall be made by Lessee
or by its agent for royalties due hereunder with respect to
such oil or gas sold off the premises and such royalties shall
be paid monthly thereafter without the necessity of Lessor
executing a division or transfer order. If said initial royalty
payment is not so made under the terms hereof, this lease
shall terminate as of 7 a.m. the first day of the month following
expiration of said 120-day period.77
Although production was obtained in the primary term, after making
royalty payments timely for two months the lessee failed to make the
next two monthly payments within the 120 days, as stipulated in the above
clause.78 Regardless, the trial court determined the lease had not
terminated, finding the lease could not terminate during the primary term.79
The court of appeals, however, reversed and rendered holding that the
lease unambiguously created a terminating condition, which modified the
primary term created in the lease’s habendum clause.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon the familiar litany
of rules of interpretation set forth in the previous section.80 While the
court adopted the lessor’s interpretation of the royalty clause, it rejected
his request that the court consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’
subsequent interpretation. According to the court, such evidence can be
considered “[o]nly where a lease is first found to be ambiguous . . . .”81
The lessee, however, had not urged the court to consider extrinsic
evidence. Instead, the lessee argued the plain language of the lease required
the court to find the lease had not terminated. Specifically, the lessee argued
77 Hitzelberger, 948 S.W.2d 497, 504 (Tex. App. — Waco 1997, writ denied).
78 Id. at 502.
79 Id. The trial court also determined that a unit agreement had amended the lease. Id.
at 503.
80 Hitzelberger, 948 S.W.2d 497, 503-04 (Tex. App. — Waco 1997, writ denied).
81 Id. at 507.
§ 3.03
EASTERN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE
106
that because delay rentals had been “paid-up” in advance, the lease could
not terminate during the primary term. Additionally, the lessee relied upon
the habendum clause, which stated the lease would continue as long as
production continued in paying quantities “and the royalties are paid as
provided.” But the lessee argued that this reference to paying royalties
did not apply to the primary term because of the “absence of a comma
separating the royalty payment condition form the secondary term.”82
The appellate court, however, rejected the lessee’s version of the “plain
meaning” of the document:
We believe [the lessee’s] focusing on the absence of a comma
places too great a weight on too frail a reed. To accept this
argument we must ignore the intent expressed in the whole
document and focus on punctuation in one sentence.83
In Hitzelberger, the Texas court adhered to the approach used in
Madeley by refusing to consider evidence of subsequent conduct in the
interpretative process absent an ambiguity determination. Additionally,
in light of the Hitzelberger court’s interpretation of the royalty clause,
this case provides a good example of language which will effectively
convert the royalty obligation into a terminating condition. Such specific
language would be necessary since generally the royalty clause does not
place a limitation on the term or habendum clause of an oil and gas lease.
The typical habendum clause is analyzed in the next section.
§ 3.04. The Habendum Clause.
[1] — In General: The Primary Term and the Secondary
Term.
The habendum clause is also known as the term clause of an oil and
gas lease. It establishes the lease’s duration, generally by providing for
two terms: the primary term and the secondary term. The primary term is
a set amount of time, usually ranging from two to 10 years, which gives
the lessee the right to explore for oil, gas and other minerals but without
82 Id. at 505.
83 Id. at 505-506.
§ 3.04
RULES OF DOCUMENT INTERPRETATION
107
any obligation to do so.84 The secondary term allows the lease to continue
as long as there is production from the premises. Structuring the lease’s
duration in this manner allows the lessee to accomplish two goals: first,
insuring sufficient time for decisions about exploration, development and
financing; and second, insuring the lessee can continue producing in order
to capitalize on its investment.
[2] — The Effect of the Delay Rental Clause.
The typical habendum clause provides that it is “subject to the other
provisions of the lease.” Thus other provisions of the lease can affect its
duration. For example, the lease term can be limited by the delay rental
clause. And depending upon the wording of that clause, the failure to
properly pay delay rentals could result in automatic termination.
[a] — The “Unless” Lease.
An “unless” delay rental clause in effect provides that the lease will
terminate unless the lessee, who has not drilled by a specified date, pays
delay rentals. In effect, the “unless” language creates a condition, as
opposed to a covenant, which imposes a limitation on the primary term of
the lease. If the lessee fails to pay according to the clause, the lease
terminates automatically. In general, equitable rules against forfeiture are
not applicable. In light of this automatic termination feature, the “unless”
lease is viewed as creating a fee simple determinable in the lessee, and a
possibility of reverter in the lessor.85 Regardless of this classification,
however, some courts have protected lessees against termination on the
basis of estoppel, revivor, and ratification. The following is an example
of an “unless” clause:
If no well be commenced on said land on or before the
_____ day of _____, 19__, this lease shall terminate as to
84 This term is usually negotiated between the parties, but some states have statutes
limiting the length of the primary term. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.115 (West 1998);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-108 (1993).
85 1 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 301 (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer
eds. 1997); Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991); Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil
Exploration and Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998).
§ 3.04
EASTERN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE
108
both parties unless the lessee shall on or before that date pay
or tender to the lessor, the sum of _____, which shall operate
as a rental and cover the privilege of deferring the
commencement of a well for twelve months from said date. In
like manner and upon subsequent like payments or tenders the
commencement of the well may be further deferred for like
periods of the same number of months successively.
[b] — The “Or” Lease.
As opposed to the “unless” lease, the “or” lease creates a covenant, not
a condition. Therefore, the lessee’s failure to pay delay rentals does not
result in automatic termination. Instead, the lessee must take affirmative
action to terminate the lease. For these reasons, the “or” lease is viewed as
creating a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent in the lessee, leaving
a right of reentry in the lessor.86 However, many “or” leases contain
forfeiture provisions which permit the lessor to terminate the lease if the
lessee has not paid rentals in a set time period. Even absent an express
forfeiture provision, courts frequently invoke equitable rules of forfeiture
to cancel an “or” lease.87 The following is an example of an “or” clause:
Lessees agree to commence a well on said premises within
_____ years from the date hereof, or pay lessor _____ cents
an acre per annum, payable quarterly in advance from the _____
day of _____, 19__, until said well is commence or this lease
surrendered.
[c] — Case Examples.
[i] — Bertani v. Beck.88
Bertani involved an “unless” lease with a short, one-year primary term.
At the end of the first year, the lessee had failed to drill or pay delay rentals.
A year later, after the lessee refused to tender rentals for two years’ delay,
the lessors filed an action in assumpsit to recover this sum.89 The trial
86 Williams & Meyers, supra note 85, at § 603.3(f).
87 See, e.g., Warner v. Haught, 329 S.E.2d 88, 96 (Sup. Ct. App W. Va. 1985).
88 Bertani v. Beck, 330 Pa. Super. 248, 479 A.2d 534 (Pa. 1984).
89 Id. at 535. The lessee had initially tendered $20,405, but the total due for two years
of delay rentals, according to the lease, was $27, 208.
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court granted summary judgment in favor of the lessors and the lessee
appealed.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed. In so doing, the court
correctly assessed the nature and effect of the “unless” lease. As the court
explained, the lease did not require the lessee to pay delay rentals:
“Paragraph 6 of the lease was intended to confer upon [the lessee] the
right to explore for the presence of minerals. If none were discovered,
[the lessee] was free to allow the lease to be forfeited by the expedient of
not paying a ‘delay rental.’”90 For that reason, the lessors had no right to
receive delay rentals, meaning the summary judgment granting them the
right to recover those monies was improper.91
[ii] — Warner v. Haught, Inc.92
While the parties in Bertani agreed that the delay rental clause
unambiguously created an “unless” lease, in Warner the lessor and lessee
disagreed about the effect of that clause. The delay rental clause in Warner
read as follows: “The said Lessee covenants and agrees to pay rental at
the rate of $1.00 per acre, per year . . . in advance, . . .until, but not after,
a well yielding royalty to the Lessors is drilled on the leased premises . .
.” (emphasis added).93 In a separate paragraph, the lease also contained a
surrender clause which permitted the lessee to terminate its obligations.94
In analyzing these lease clauses, the court began with a scholarly
review of the differences between “unless” and “or” leases.95 In light of
the language in the delay rental clause stating the “lessee covenants” to
pay rental, the court held the lease did not convert delay rental payments
90 Bertani, at 537.
91 Id. at 536. The court also determined that Amoco had not revived the lease by
tendering late payments since the tender was rejected by the lessors.
92 Warner v. Haught, Inc., 174 W. Va. 722, 329 S.E.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. 1985).
93 Id. at 93.
94 Id. The surrender clause stated: “Upon payment of one ($1.00) Dollar at any time,
by . . .[the lessee], . . . it or they shall have the right to surrender this lease for cancellation,
after which all payments and liabilities thereafter to accrue under any by virtue of its
terms shall cease and determine, and this lease becomes absolutely null and void.”
95 Warner, 174 W. Va. 722, 329 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1985).
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into a condition, which would lead to automatic termination of the lease.
Moreover, the court noted that the surrender clause was consistent with
the creation of an “or” lease, not an “unless” lease. In reaching this
conclusion, the court also invoked a canon of construction: “terms are to
be construed most strongly against the party who solicited and prepared
the lease, in this case the lessee.”96 However, the court determined that in
light of the clear language of the lease that canon did not aid the lessors’
case. Therefore, the court held the lease language created an “or” lease.
In addition to interpreting the lease, however, the court also addressed
the parol evidence rule. That rule was implicated because the lessors
claimed that, despite the language of the lease, the lessees had represented
that the lease would terminate automatically if delay rentals were not
paid timely. The court recognized that such testimony could be admissible
under the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule.97 Therefore, it
reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of the lessees, and
remanded the case to the trial court.
Because on remand the lease could be determined to include an
automatic termination provision, the court addressed another question
which it viewed as the “central issue” in the case: whether a unique West
Virginia statute applied to an “unless” lease.98 That statute imposes notice
and demand requirements upon lessors who have not received delay
rentals. The lessors in Warner had not complied with this requirement.
Therefore, they argued, first, that their lease was an “unless” lease, and
second, that the statute did not apply to “unless” leases. After reviewing
the language and history behind the statute, the West Virginia court agreed
that the statute applied only to “or” leases: “[T]he statute provided an
expeditious means, without resort to judicial process, to require lessees
96 Id. at 93.
97 Id. at 94. The court recited a traditional definition of the rule: “A written contract
merges all negotiations and representations which occurred before its execution, and in
the absence of fraud, mistake, or material misrepresentations extrinsic evidence cannot
be used to alter or interpret language in a written contract which is otherwise plain and
unambiguous on its face.” Id.
98 Id. at 91.
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in ‘or’ type leases to pay the rentals due under the lease if they did not
wish to have the lease canceled under the statute.”99
Having decided the statute in general applied to “or” leases, the Warner
court left it to the lower court to label the lease in dispute as either an “or”
or “unless” lease on remand. Because an “or” determination would permit
the application of equitable rules of forfeiture, the appellate court also
considered the application of those rules to this case. In reviewing the
function of those rules, the court noted that “forfeiture is favored, when
instead of working a loss or injury contrary to equity, it promotes justice
and equity and protects the owner against the indifference, laches, and
injurious conduct of the lessee.”100 Regarding the interaction of the
forfeiture rules and the West Virginia statute, the court concluded that if a
lessee repeatedly fails to pay rentals on time, forcing the lessor to
constantly seek relief under the statute, a finding of equitable forfeiture
could be appropriate.101
Warner serves as a reminder that several sources must be consulted
in order to clarify the legal obligations created by an oil and gas lease.
The starting point is the language of the lease. Next, as discussed in the
first section of this chapter, extrinsic evidence could be relevant in the
interpretative process or under the parol evidence rule. In this case, the
lessor relied upon the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule as a vehicle
to introduce extrinsic evidence, a tactic which helped the lessors avoid a
summary judgment rendered by the trial court in the lessee’s favor.102
Additionally, Warner demonstrates that statutory enactments may
significantly affect the rights and liabilities of parties to an oil and gas
99 Id. at 95.
100 Warner, 174 W. Va. 722, 329 S.E.2d 88, 96 (1985).
101 Id. In this case, however, the court found the circuit court had not erred in finding
forfeiture unjustified at the time in question. The court also determined that issues of fact
precluded a summary judgment based on the doctrine of abandonment. Id. at 97-98.
102 Had the lessor argued that under rules of interpretation the court should consider the
lessee’s representations about automatic termination, the court may have refused to do
so. In that instance, the court could have determined that the plain language of the delay
rental clause, particularly the word “covenant,” prohibited the consideration of any extrinsic
evidence to show a “condition” was created.
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lease.103 And finally, the decision reminds that equitable considerations,
here the doctrine of equitable forfeiture, could alter the effect of express
lease provisions.
[iii] — Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
Harrison104
Like Warner, the Harrison case provides another example of the role
of equitable doctrines in determining a lessee’s rights under an oil and gas
lease. That case involved an “unless” lease. The Ottos owned three-fourths
of the minerals under a 1074.4 acre tract. This property was eventually
leased to Humble Oil. Subsequently, the Ottos executed a conveyance to
Harrison which provided that Harrison would own “an undivided one-half
(1/2) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals” under the
property, meaning the grantors were “conveying two-thirds (2/3) of their
said three-fourths (3/4) of the minerals, or an undivided one-half (1/2) of
said minerals.” The deed also provided that “one-half (1/2) of the money
rentals” from leases on the property would be paid to the grantee.105
After receiving notice of this conveyance, an attorney for Humble
determined that thereafter Humble should pay Harrison one-half of the
delay rentals which it had previously been paying to the Ottos for their 3/4
interest. Harrison accepted two rental payments from Humble calculated
in this manner. However, he rejected the next payment and claimed the
lease entitled him to one-half of the total rental payments Humble owed.
He also asserted that the lease had terminated, even though Humble tendered
the amount Harrison demanded.106
Humble Oil then brought suit for removal of cloud from and to quiet
its title in the leased property. The trial court and the court of appeals ruled
in favor of Harrison.107 The Texas Supreme Court, however, held that the
103 In addition to West Virginia, Kentucky has a statute which has been held to apply to
both “unless” and “or” leases. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353.020 (Michie 1996); Walter v.
Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 300 Ky. 43, 187 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1945).
104 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1947).
105 Id. at 357.
106 Id. at 358.
107 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 199 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. — Galveston
1947, writ denied).
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lease had not terminated and reversed and rendered in favor of Humble
Oil.108
In reaching this conclusion, the court began by construing the mineral
deed from the Ottos to Harrison. However, the court did not engage in a
lengthy or careful review of the rules of document interpretation. Instead,
the court was curt in its analysis and imprecise in its use of the ambiguity
label. First, rather than rely on canons of construction in deciding whether
the deed was ambiguous, the court stated that “where the language of the
grant is ambiguous, it is to be construed against grantors rather than against
grantee.”109 Next, the court concluded that “While an ambiguity is created
by the reference in the mineral deed to the leases executed by the Ottos
and the rentals payable thereunder, we conclude that, considering the deed
as a whole, the intention of the parties was that Harrison was granted the
right to receive one-half of the entire rentals and not merely one-half of
the rentals payable to the Ottos.”110
In light of that determination, Harrison claimed the lease had
terminated since Humble’s delay rental payments were not consistent with
the court’s conclusion about his title. Indeed, under the automatic
termination feature on an “unless” lease, Harrison’s contention would
technically be correct. The court, however, demonstrated a well-recognized
tendency to avoid the automatic forfeiture feature of such leases by turning
to equitable considerations.111 Specifically, the court determined that,
“While we do not know of any case presenting the exact situation involved
here, we think the general principles of equitable estoppel are
applicable.”112 In this case, the court determined that Harrison was
estopped to assert that the lease had terminated because of its failure to
pay him correctly. In expounding upon facts which could lead to an
estoppel, the court pointed to 1) the lessee’s good faith mistake in
108 Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355, 361 (1947).
109 Id. at 360, emphasis added.
110 Id.
111 See, e.g., Eugene Kuntz et al., 2 Oil and Gas Law 161 (3d ed. 1998); Greer v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 200 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1952); Vaughan v. Doss, 219 Ark. 963, 245
S.W.2d 826 (Ark. 1952); Thurner v. Kaufman, 237 Kan. 184, 699 P.2d 435 (Kan. 1984).
112 Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355, 361 (1947).
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construing a deed making a partial conveyance of the lessor’s interest;
and, 2) the conveyee’s initial silence after accepting payments.113
Humble established a trend which courts in Texas, and other states,
have chosen to follow.114 In several subsequent cases, the courts have
turned to equitable doctrines to avoid the forfeiture created when a lessee
fails to comply with the delay rental clause. In addition to equitable
estoppel, these equitable defenses include waiver, ratification, and revivor.
In practice, however, commentators have noted that courts and parties
tend to blur the distinctions between these equitable remedies.115 For
example, in Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Corp.,116 the Texas Supreme
Court determined that a lease had not terminated, despite the lessee’s
failure to timely pay delay rentals, when the lessor later accepted a check
endorsed “lease rental.” In the court’s view, the lessor’s acceptance of
this check had the effect of reviving the original lease. However, as
Professors Smith and Weaver have noted, technically a revivor could occur
only if the lessor in fact realized the lease had terminated and intended to
execute a new one.117 Yet Brannon, Humble Oil, and other cases
demonstrate that lessees may be able to avoid the automatic termination
feature of an “unless” lease by relying upon equitable remedies.
113 Id. A North Dakota case involving similar issues reached a different result. In
Schwartzenberger v. Hunt Trust Estate, 244 N.W.2d 711 (N.D. 1976), the North Dakota
Supreme Court distinguished Humble Oil for several reasons. First, the court considered
that the lessee in Schwartzenberger had acted negligently in reviewing deed records;
the lessors had given adequate notice to the lessee’s about the dispute; and, unlike in
Humble, the lessee had failed to tender an amount sufficient to cover the disputed amount.
Id. at 717.
114 See, e.g., Ledford v. Atkins, 413 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1967); Hove v. Atchison, 238 F.2d
819 (8th Cir. N.D. 1956); Bertani 330 Pa. Super. 248, 479 A.2d 534 (Pa.
1984)(recognizing revivor as a feasible remedy but considering it inapplicable since the
lessor had not accepted a late tender of rentals; see also Kuntz et al., supra note 112, at
159).
115 See Bruce Kramer, “The Temporary Cessation Doctrine: A Practical Response to
an Ideological Dilemma,” 43 Baylor L. Rev. 519, 541-42 (1991).
116 Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Corp., 562 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. 1977).
117 Ernest E. Smith & Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Texas Law of Oil and Gas §§ 3.8(B), at
134; 6.3(A), at 287-0 (1997).
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[3] — The “Production” Requirement in the Habendum
Clause.
The lessee’s failure to comply with the delay rental clause in an oil
and gas lease affects its rights only during the primary term. In order to
extend its interest into the secondary term, the lessee must satisfy the
“production” provision in the habendum clause. In determining the
meaning of that word, courts have largely relegated the rules of document
interpretation to a minor role. In fact, those rules are often decidedly absent
from decisions scrutinizing the meaning of the word “produced.”118
Instead, those decisions feature other considerations. For example, in
determining that the term “produced” means capable of producing in
paying quantities, which does not include marketing, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court rejected a literal construction of the habendum clause:
clause, uninterrupted production — following expiration of
primary term — would be indispensable to maintain a lease
in force. This would mean, of course, that any cessation of
production. . . would put an end to the lease. Oklahoma has
rejected that literal a view. Our law is firmly settled that the
result in each case must depend upon the circumstances that
surround cessation. Our view is no doubt influenced in part
by the strong policy of our statutory law against forfeiture of
estates.119
In addition to policy considerations, different views about the basic
purpose behind an oil and gas lease have led to different definitions for
the word “produced.” As Professor Kuntz has explained, jurisdictions
such as Oklahoma and West Virginia view the main purpose of the lease
as the discovery of oil and gas. Texas, on the other hand, views the purpose
of the lease as developing the property “for the mutual benefit of the
118 See, e.g., Babb v. Clemensen, 455 Pa. Super. 181, 687 A.2d 1120 (Pa. Super. 1996);
Waddle v. Lucky Strike Oil Co., 551 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn. 1977); McCullough Oil, Inc. v.
Rezek, 176 W. Va. 638, 346 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 1986).
119 Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp. 604 P.2d 854, 858 (Okla. 1979). Oklahoma is a non-
ownership jurisdiction which views the oil and gas lease as creating a profit, rather than
a fee simple determinable. 1 Brown, The Law of Oil and Gas Leases § 3.02[2], at 3-8
(1998).
§ 3.04
EASTERN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE
116
lessor and lessee, and that the lessee should not be permitted to hold the
lease for speculation.”120
[4] — Savings Clauses.
[a] — In General.
Regardless of the variations in the definition of production, lessees in
all jurisdictions face practical problems in satisfying that requirement.
For that reason, the “typical” oil and gas lease contains savings clauses
which are designed to preserve the lease despite the lessee’s failure to
achieve “production” at the end of the primary term, or despite the
cessation of production during the secondary term. These savings clauses
include:
1) Operations Clauses: These clauses are designed to bridge the gap
from the primary term to the secondary term. But for these clauses, the
lease would terminate at the end of the primary term if oil and gas are not
being “produced.” However, an operations clause permits a lessee to
maintain its interest if it has commenced operations prior to the end of the
primary term and continues those operations past that date, without
cessation for more than a set period of time.121
Depending upon the wording of the clause, these operations may
include the drilling of a well other than the one commenced prior to the
end of the primary term. In that event, the operations clause has been
120 2 Eugene Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas §§ 26.5, 26.6 (1987). Professor Kuntz
listed three rules which have developed in order to extend an oil and gas lease beyond the
primary term. These are 1) discovery alone (Oklahoma and West Virginia); 2) jurisdictions
which distinguish between oil and gas, requiring extraction for oil but discovery only for
gas (Montana, Wyoming, Kentucky, and Tennessee); and 3) production requires actual
production and marketing (Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, Kansas, Illinois, Michigan,
and Ohio). Id. at § 26.6.
While jurisdictions have adopted these varying definitions of the production
requirement as it applies to extending the lease into the secondary term, virtually all
jurisdictions require the production to be in “paying quantities” to hold the lease.
Regarding jurisdictions falling in the first category, listed above, Professor Hemingway
has explained that “‘production’ in these states may be defined as being a well which is
completed and capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities . . . [in these states]
the lessee will have a reasonable time within which to market the products.” Richard
Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas § 6.4, at 317 (3d ed. 1971).
121 3 Williams & Meyers, supra note 86, at § 603.3(f).
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labeled a continuous operations clause. If, on the other hand, the clause
requires the lessee to complete in the secondary term, the very well it
commenced in the primary term, the clause is known as a “well
completion” clause.122 As demonstrated by the Rogers case discussed
below, reasonable minds may differ about language required to create a
“well completion” clause instead of a “continuous operations” clause.
2) Cessation of Production Clauses: As the name implies, these clauses
permit the lessee to maintain its interest even if production ceases in the
secondary term.123 In general, such a clause gives the lessee 60 to 90
days to commence drilling or reworking operations or the lease will
terminate. Without this savings clause, the lessee’s interest under an
“unless” lease would automatically terminate when production
“ceased.”124
To avoid termination in this instance, however, courts have developed
the “temporary cessation of production” doctrine. Under that doctrine, a
lessee has a reasonable time to resume production if the cessation resulted
from “sudden stoppage of the well,” “mechanical breakdown,” “or the
like.”125 If a lease contains an express cessation of production clause,
however, courts have chosen to adhere to the time periods set forth therein,
rather than permit a “reasonable time” of cessation, as allowed under the
court-created doctrine. Therefore, as demonstrated by the Samano case
discussed below, determining the presence or absence of an express clause
could be crucial to the lessee’s survival.
3) Dry Hole Clauses: A “dry hole” savings clause is designed to protect
the lessee after it has drilled a non-producing well. These clauses typically
give the lessee a set time to begin drilling or reworking operations after
122 3 Williams & Meyers, supra note 86, at § 617.1.
123 3 Williams & Meyers, supra note 86, § 616.2, at 284).
124 Whether cessation has occurred depends upon the jurisdiction’s definition of the
production requirement.
125 Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1941). See generally,
Kramer, supra note 115, at 519. Under the doctrine, a lease will not terminate if the
cessation lasts only for a “reasonable” amount of time. Courts have considered a cessation
for as long as four years “reasonable.” See Saulsberry v. Siegel, 252 S.W.2d 834 (Ark.
1952).
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having drilled a dry hole. Significantly, these clauses rarely define the
term “dry hole,” but it is generally viewed as an “unsuccessful drilling
operation.”126
4) Other Savings Clauses: Other savings clauses found in a “typical”
oil and gas lease include the shut-in royalty clause, force majeure, and
pooling clauses. Over the decades, these and the other savings clauses
discussed above have been the subject of countless court decisions and
academic commentary.127 This chapter includes examples of cases
involving the operations, cessation of production, and dry hole clauses,
which further demonstrate the unpredictability of the interpretative
process.
 [b] — Case Examples.
[i] — Rogers v. Osborn.128
Rogers illustrates the interplay of the three savings clauses described
above, the operations clause, the cessation of production clause, and the
dry hole clause. In that case, the lessee commenced well number one
prior to the date which marked the end of the primary term, September
21, 1947. On that date, however, the well was not producing in paying
quantities. Therefore, unless the lease was propelled into the secondary
term by some other provision, the lease terminated.
126 4 Kuntz, supra note 121, at § 47.2(c).
127 3 Williams & Meyers, supra note 86, at §§ 613-614.5.). While these clauses are not
discussed in this chapter, they have been the subject of a number of excellent commentaries.
See, e.g., Robert E. Beck, “Shutting-In: For What Reasons and for How Long? “ 33
Washburn L.J. 749 (1994)(discussing shut-in royalty clauses); John Lowe, “Shut-In
Royalty Payments,” 5 E. Min. L. Inst. ch. 18 (1984)(discussing shut-in royalty clause);
Owen L. Anderson, “Calculating Royalty: ‘Costs’ Subsequent To Production . . . ‘Figures
Don’t Lie But . . .,’” 33 Washburn L.J. 591 (1994)(discussing pooling clause); Richard F.
Brown, “Oil, Gas and Mineral Law,” 49 SMU L. Rev. 1177 (1996)(discussing pooling
clause); John Lowe, “Negotiating Oil and Gas Leases for the Lessee,” 1 Nat. Resources
& Env’t 1 (1985)(including a discussion on pooling clause); Joan Teshima, Annotation,
“Gas and Oil Lease Force Majeure Provisions: Construction and Effect,” 46 A.L.R. 4th
976 (1987)(discussing force majeure clauses); Owen Anderson, “Drilling for Black Gold
Under the Model Form Drilling Contracts,” 15 E. Min. L. Inst. ch. 9 (1994)(discussing
force majeure clauses).
128 Rogers v. Osborn, 261 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1953).
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The three possible savings clauses were contained in paragraph 5 of
the lease. This paragraph contained a typical, albeit a confusing,
configuration of these clauses, with the dry hole and cessation clauses
combined in the first few sentences, followed by an operations clause.129
The court quickly dispensed with the dry hole clause since the lessees
had obtained a jury finding that well number one was not a dry hole.130
One might consider that the opposite of a dry hole is a producing well,
but that was not the case here. Instead, because the well had never produced
in paying quantities, it had not “produced.”131 And, as the court noted,
“If production never began, it could not ‘cease,’”132 rendering the cessation
of production clause inapplicable.
After that analysis, the operations clause remained as the only savings
clause which could save the lease. That clause read as follows:
If at the expiration of the primary term oil, gas or other mineral
is not being produced on said land but lessee is then engaged
in drilling or re-working operations thereon, this lease shall
remain in force so long as operations are prosecuted with no
cessation of more than thirty (30) consecutive days, and if
they result in the production of oil, gas or other mineral so
long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced from
said land . . . .133
The lessee argued that it had complied with the terms of this clause.
While well number one never produced in paying quantities, the lessee
had also drilled well number two after the expiration of the primary term,
which became a producer. By relying upon well number two, the lessee
in effect viewed this clause as a “continuous operations” clause, as
described above. The court, however, disagreed and read the clause as
creating a “well completion” clause.
129 Id. at 312.
130 Id. at 312.
131 After the well was completed it was subjected to “periodic flowing” of “oily mud.”
Id. at 311.
132 Rogers, 261 S.W.2d at 313.
133 Id. at 312.
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In reaching this conclusion, the court scrutinized the language of the
lease by comparing language in the operations clause with language in
the dry hole and cessation of production clauses. Specifically, the court
noted that while the dry hole and cessation of production clauses provided
that “additional” drilling or reworking operations would maintain the
lease,134 the word “additional” was missing from the operations clause.
Therefore, according to the court, “This sentence means that if production
results from the continuous prosecution of the very operations being
engaged in by the lessees upon the expiration of the primary term, the
lease is good.”135
A dissenting justice would have classified the operations clause as a
continuous operations clause, a conclusion which would have allowed
the lessee to rely on its work on well number two to save the lease. The
dissent adopted the opinion of the intermediate appellate court: “No
limitation is placed upon the word ‘operations’ the second time it is used
in the clause . . . [t]here is no verbal basis for restricting ‘operations’ to
those actually being prosecuted at the end of the primary term.”136
In reaching their respective opinions, neither the dissent, the majority,
nor the court of appeals recited the rules of document interpretation.137
Nonetheless, these opinions stand as a reminder that one can rarely predict
the interpretation a judge will attach to an oil and gas lease provision. As
134 The dry hole and cessation of production clauses read as follows: “If prior to discovery
of oil or gas on said land Lessee should drill a dry hole or holes thereon, or if after
discovery of oil or gas the production thereof should cease from any cause, this lease
shall not terminate if lessee commences additional drilling or reworking operations within
sixty (60) days thereafter . . ..” Id. at 313.
135 Rogers, 261 S.W.2d at 315.
136 Rogers v. Osborn, 250 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Civ. App. — San Antonio 1952),
rev’d, 261 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1953).
137 Id.
138 As a result of Rogers, operations clauses frequently have the phrase “or any other
such operations” inserted to insure the clause is classified as a continuous operations
clause, rather than a well completion clause. Eugene Kuntz, supra note 111, at 211.
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always, the Rogers decision provides direction, but no guarantees, for
future drafting, which is little consolation for the losing party.138
[ii] — McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek.139
Rezek presented the opportunity for the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia to explain the effect of a temporary cessation clause on the
application of the temporary cessation doctrine. While these disputes
generally arise between lessors and their lessees, in this case the original
lessee sued assignees of the lease. The original lease, executed in 1966,
contained a cessation of production clause which allowed the lessee,
McCullough, 60 days to resume operations after cessation. Subsequently,
McCullough assigned the lease to Rezek. That assignment provided that
if Rezek abandoned the lease for any reason, then it would revert to
McCullough. This lease was eventually assigned to Reynolds in 1977.
Three years later, he executed a surrender of this lease to the lessors, who
then executed a new lease to Reynolds.140
These actions prompted McCullough to file suit claiming that
Reynold’s surrender of the lease constituted an abandonment of the lease
under the terms of the assignment. For that reason, McCullough claimed
the lease had reverted to him. The trial court disagreed, finding that
McCullough’s lease had terminated “due to cessation of production after
the primary term without resumption of operations within sixty days as
required by the lease.”141
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. In so doing,
the court began with an examination of the nature of the oil and gas lease
and the effect of the cessation of production clause on the lessee’s rights.142
Because of the presence of this clause, the court clarified:
 [t]he parties are bound by such clause’s definition of a
“temporary” cessation of production, and the imprecise
common law doctrine of temporary cessation of production
139 McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 176 W. Va. 638, 346 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 1986).
140 Id. at 791.
141 Id. at 792.
142 Id. at 792. The court noted that “[a]n oil and gas lease (or other mineral lease) is both
a conveyance and a contract.”
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(which allows a “reasonable” period of time to resume
operations) is not applicable to extend the lease beyond the
precisely fixed “grace” period stated in the cessation of
production clause of the lease.143
However, while the court determined that the common law doctrine
did not apply in this case, the court nevertheless concluded that the nine-
year period of cessation in this case, “without any attempted justification,”
was not “temporary.”144
[iii] — Jolynne Corp. v. Michels145
In Michels, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia again
turned to the “temporary cessation of production” doctrine to determine
whether a lease had terminated. In that case, the lease apparently did not
contain a cessation of production clause.146 For that reason, the court
relied upon the description of the “temporary cessation of production”
doctrine as set forth in Rezek. According to Rezek, the following factors
should be considered in determining whether a cessation was temporary:
the length of time, the cause of the delay, and whether the lessee had
exercised reasonable diligence to resume production.147 After weighing
these factors, the court in Michels determined the lease had terminated
143 Id. at 794 n.5.
144 Id. The court also addressed another clause in the lease, the notice and demand
clause. The lessee had argued that this clause entitled him to notice before the lease
automatically terminated under the terms of the lease. The court stressed that under an
“unless” lease a lessee is under no obligation to resume operations after cessation and
the notice and demand clause applies only to obligations, or covenants, imposed by the
lease. Id. at 796.
145 Jolynne Corp. v. Michels, 446. S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1994).
146 Although the court’s opinion never directly acknowledges the absence of a cessation
of production clause, it proceeds as if the lease contained no such clause.
147 Id. at 500 (quoting Rezek).
148 Id. at 500. The court also noted that the domestic use of gas does not satisfy the
“production” requirement of the habendum clause. Id. (citing Goodwin v. Wright, 255
S.E.2d 924 (1979)).
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when no production had occurred for nine years and after that date gas
was produced only for domestic use.148
While the Rezek opinion contains no recitation of rules of
interpretation, the Michels opinion did address the parties’ differing
interpretations of the lease. The habendum clause established a primary
term of two years and a secondary term that would last “as long thereafter
as the said land is operated by the Lessee in the search for or production
of oil or gas.”149 Additionally, the lease stated that it was “for the sole
and only purpose of operating for and producing oil and gas . . . .” The
lessee, however, argued that the lease had another noncommercial purpose,
which was to supply gas for the lessor’s consumption. In rejecting this
argument, the court relied upon the following rule:
A written contract merges all negotiations and representations which
occurred before its execution, and in the absence of fraud, mistake, or
material misrepresentations, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to alter or
interpret language in a written contract which is otherwise plain and
unambiguous.150
In light of the mixed signals contained in this recitation, it is unclear
whether the court relied upon the parol evidence rule or rules of
interpretation. By stating that a contract “merges all negotiations and
representations” and noting the fraud exception, the court adopted language
identified with the parol evidence rule. But the court also used syntax
associated with the “plain meaning” approach to interpretation by
proclaiming that extrinsic evidence cannot be considered to interpret an
unambiguous contract.
The court’s intermixing of “parol evidence” terms with rules of
interpretation reflects the common confusion about the two sets of rules
and a prevailing tendency among courts, lawyers, and commentators to
merge the concepts. But Michels also represents the reason the distinction
often makes no difference: the court likely would have reached the same
conclusion about whether extrinsic evidence could be considered based
on either the parol evidence rule or the rules of document interpretation.
The distinction became particularly insignificant in Michels when the court
149 Michels, 446 S.E.2d at 500.
150 Id. at 499.
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determined that even assuming the lease had a noncommercial purpose,
as the lessee asserted, that purpose had not been satisfied where no
production of gas occurred for almost 10 years.151
[iv] — Samano v. Sun Oil Company.152
In Samano, the Texas Supreme Court produced majority and dissenting
opinions which agreed that an express cessation of production clause
precluded the application of the “temporary cessation” doctrine. These
opinions also agreed that the plain meaning of the lease should control.
However, exemplifying a trait common among document interpretation
cases, the opinions disagreed about the plain meaning of the lease at issue.
The habendum clause of the lease in dispute read as follows:
2. Subject to the other provisions herein contained, this lease
shall remain in force for a term of ten (10) years from this
date, called “primary term,” and as long thereafter as oil, gas
or other mineral is produced from said land, or as long
thereafter as Lessee shall conduct drilling or reworking
operations thereon with no cessation of more than sixty
consecutive days until production results, and if production
results, so long as any such mineral is produced.153
The primary term ended March 29, 1944. The lease was extended
into the secondary term by production, which ceased on May 4, 1977.
The lessee did not restore production until July 15, resulting in a cessation
of 73 days. The lessors claimed the lease had terminated since the cessation
lasted longer than 60 days as permitted by the lease. The lessees countered
that the 60-day provision did not cover cessation of production, meaning
the “temporary cessation of production” doctrine applied. In effect, the
lessees viewed the 60-day provision as a continuous operations clause,
not a cessation of production clause.
The trial court agreed with the lessors and held the lease had terminated
by its own terms. The court of appeals, however, reversed in favor of the
151 Id. at 500.
152 Samano v. Sun Oil Company, 621 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1981).
153 Id. at 581.
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lessees. The lessors appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, which ultimately
agreed with the trial court’s determination.
In interpreting the lease’s habendum clause, the author of the supreme
court’s majority opinion invoked “Standard Rules of English.”154 He also
viewed the clause as containing three divisions, one ending after the
description of the primary term, the next beginning with the phrase “and
as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced,” and the final
division as reading “or as long thereafter as Lessee shall conduct drilling
or re-working operations thereon with no cessation of more than sixty
consecutive days until production results . . . .”
According to the majority opinion, the court of appeals and the dissent
ignored these three divisions. Relying on several textbooks on English
grammar, the majority determined that “modifiers are intended to refer to
the words closest to them.”155 Because the 60-day provision followed
the division describing the secondary term, not the primary term, the
majority concluded that the clause applied to “both parts of the habendum
clause that is, to operations at the end of the primary term and also the
cessation of production during the secondary term.”156
While disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion, the dissent also
focused on English grammar, particular the role of modifiers. Specifically,
the dissent determined that the word “‘or’ should be read as disjunctive,
not conjunctive.”157 Read in this manner, according to the dissent, the
“or” provides an alternative to the preceding phrase regarding production,
and thereby modifies the first phrase establishing the primary term. In
other words, the dissent concluded the word “cessation” referred to
operations in effect at the end of the primary term, not the cessation of
production in the secondary term. Therefore, the lease contained an
operations clause, not a cessation of production clause, permitting the
application of the “temporary cessation of production” doctrine. And under
154 Samano, 621 S.W.2d at 581. The majority opinion was written by Justice Pope.
155 Id. at 581.
156 Id. at 582.
157 Id. at 585 (Denton, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 587.
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that doctrine the inquiry would be whether a 73 day cessation constituted
a reasonable time.158
In addition to disagreeing with the majority’s application of grammar
rules, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis of case law. For
example, the dissent pointed to Gulf Oil Corporation v. Reid, a case cited
by the majority, and noted stark differences between the language in the
savings clause in that case and the lease at issue. Specifically, the clause
in Reid stated “if after the discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities the
production thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not
terminate if the lessee commences additional drilling” in a set time
period.159 The Samano lease, on the contrary, contained no specific
reference to the “cessation of production” after production had been
obtained.
Many lawyers, including this author, may have predicted that the
lessee’s interpretation of the lease would prevail. Indeed, the dissent’s
analysis of case law and its reading of the habendum clause seem accurate.
Obviously, however, as demonstrated by the conflicting opinions produced
in the Samano case, accuracy is an ephemeral concept in document
interpretation cases.
§ 3.05. Equipment Removal Provisions.
[1] — In General.
In addition to clauses which determine if a lease has terminated, oil
and gas leases generally contain clauses that determine the lessee’s rights
after the lease has terminated. One example is equipment removal
provisions. After investing considerable amounts of money in equipment,
a lessee wants to insure that it has the right to remove this equipment.
Absent an express provision protecting this right, courts often turn to
common law concepts, such as implied licenses, to permit the lessee a
reasonable time to return to the property and remove its personal
property.160 Rather than rely on these concepts, however, lessees prefer
an express clause to protect their rights. To provide the lessee with wide
discretion, these clauses frequently provide that a lessee may remove its
159 Id. at 585.
160 1 Brown, supra note 119, at § 10.02; 4 Kuntz, supra note 120, at § 50.3.
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equipment “at any time.” However, as demonstrated by the case discussed
below, courts have disagreed about the meaning of that phrase.
[2] — Case Examples.
[a] — Willison v. Consolidation Coal Company.161
Willison involved a lease which was originally executed in 1901. This
lease provided that the lessee would “pay ($300.00) . . . per year for the
gas from each and every gas well. . . .” Another clause stated the lessee
would “have the privilege . . . at any time to remove all machinery and
fixtures placed on said premises, and further, upon the payment of $50.00,
at any time . . . Lessee shall have the right to surrender this lease for
cancellation . . . .”162
Under this lease, a well was drilled which produced natural gas. In
1932, the lease was amended to reduce the rental payments for gas, since
inadequate quantities of gas were being produced. The amendment also
provided that this rent was to be paid “so long thereafter as the [lessee]
shall find it profitable to maintain its equipment at said well . . . .”163
Over 50 years later, in 1987, the lease was assigned to Consol, which
had the coal rights under the leased land. Consol had acquired the lease
in order to plug the gas well and facilitate the extraction of the more
valuable coal.164 Therefore, it gave notice to the Willisons, who were the
successors-in-interest to the original lessors, of its intent to plug the well
and remove equipment. Although the well was producing only small
quantities of gas, the lease allowed the Willisons to use the gas, for their
own purposes, free of charge. For that reason, the Willisons filed suit
seeking to enjoin Consol from plugging the well. The trial court granted
the injunction, relying in part on an implied covenant that requires a lessee
161 Willison v. Consolidation Coal Company, 637 A.2d 979 (Pa. 1993).
162 Id. at 980.
163 Id.
164 If the well had not been plugged, the coal would have to remain in place “to provide
physical support for the operating well.” Id. at 981.
165 Willison, 637 A.2d at 981.
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168 Id. at 982 (Montemuro, J., concurring). The concurring justice also recognized that
other jurisdictions, such as Oklahoma, had chosen to require lessees to operate a well as
long as it was profitable, despite the presence of the phrase “at any time” in an equipment
removal clause. Id.
169 For that reason, the concurring justice would have remanded the case for a
determination as to the well’s profitability. Id.
to operate a well as long as it is profitable. The superior court affirmed
that decision.165
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, reversed. In so doing,
the court criticized the trial court for failing to apply “the plain language of
the lease that allowed Consol to remove its equipment ‘at any time’. . .
.”
166
 Having invoked the “plain language” approach, the court
acknowledged the perpetual debate about “whether to accord a literal
interpretation to language chosen by the parties or interpret their language
in light of other factors such as surmised purpose, common commercial
practice, public interest, etc.”167 Ultimately, the court decided that
precedents in Pennsylvania require giving effect to the plain meaning of
terms used in a contract. Because the express language of this lease
provided that Consol could remove its equipment “any time,” Consol
was not required to continue operating the well.
Ironically, a concurring justice opined that, “I also believe that the
plain language of the lease controls the outcome of this case.”168 However,
he viewed the lease, as amended in 1932, as expressly requiring the lessee
to operate the well until it was no longer profitable to do so.169 Thus
even though the concurring and majority opinions agreed upon the “plain
meaning” approach, they could not agree upon the plain meaning of the
lease.
3.06.  Conclusion.
Theoretically, the rules of document interpretation should provide a
reliable guide when courts are asked to determine the legal ramifications
of express lease provisions. But the cases discussed herein reveal several
problems with that theory. First, pervasive disagreement exists about the
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substance of the interpretative process. In particular, courts and
commentators disagree about the use of extrinsic evidence. Second, even
when judges and parties agree that a lease is “unambiguous,” and its “plain
meaning” should govern, they more often than not disagree about that
meaning. Finally, courts frequently relegate the rules of interpretation to
a minor role, focusing instead on other considerations, such as public
policy, equitable doctrines, or statutory enactments.
For the practitioner, these problems lead to unpredictability. On the
other hand, they also expand the list of arguments an advocate can assert
when faced with litigation over the meaning of express lease provisions.
In order to avoid such litigation, drafters, before selecting language, should
carefully scrutinize past court decisions and anticipate changes in
circumstances and differing interpretations. While these efforts will not
guarantee that a court will interpret a lease clause as intended, they provide
the only safeguard against the nebulous nature of the interpretative process.
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